A Compact AES Hardware Implementation Secure Against 1st-Order Side-Channel Attacks
Published in PROOFS 2019 (8th International Workshop on Security Proofs for Embedded Systems), 2019
Citation: Wei Cheng, Claude Carlet, Kouassi Goli, Jean-Luc Danger and Sylvain Guilley. Detecting Faults in Inner Product Masking Scheme - IPM-FD: IPM with Fault Detection. PROOFS@CHES 2019 : 1-16. [Online link, Full version, Slides, BibTeX]
Side-channel analysis and fault injection attacks are two typical threats to cryptographic implementations, especially in modern embedded devices. Thus there is an insistent demand for dual side-channel and fault injection protections. As it is known, masking scheme is a kind of provable countermeasures against side-channel attacks. Recently, inner product masking (IPM) was proposed as a promising higher-order masking scheme against side-channel analysis, but not for fault injection attacks. In this paper, we devise a new masking scheme named IPM-FD. It is built on IPM, which enables fault detection. This novel masking scheme has three properties: the security orders in the word-level probing model, bit-level probing model, and the number of detected faults. IPM-FD is proven secure both in the word-level and in the bit-level probing models, and allows for end-to-end fault detection against fault injection attacks.
Furthermore, we illustrate its security order by linking it to one defining parameters of linear code, and show its implementation cost by applying IPM-FD to AES-128.
The C implementation can be found here: IPM-FD on AES-128.